Functional Equivalents of the Border,
Sovereignty, and the Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment's restrictions on searches do not apply
at the nation's borders. Law enforcement agents may search any
individual entering the country even without a warrant or a showing of probable cause.' According to the Supreme Court, this border search exception may apply with equal force away from the
actual border at locations that are "functional border equivalents."
The Court, however, has never defined a functional border
equivalent or set forth the scope of searches it would permit at
such a location.
The two circuits most closely concerned with these questions
have provided quite different answers. The Fifth Circuit has permitted warrantless searches at "distant" border equivalents-those
areas where a majority of the traffic through a checkpoint is international.2 The Ninth Circuit has limited warrantless searches to
"virtual" border equivalents-those areas where all but an insignificant portion of the traffic is international.' In practice this disagreement translates into a striking difference in the kinds of
searches permissible in near-border areas within these two
circuits.4
I For a discussion of the development of the border search exception to the fourth
amendment, see infra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
This comment uses the term "border search" in a very narrow sense. The term refers
only to routine searches by customs or border patrol agents conducted pursuant to statutory
authority but without the probable cause or warrant safeguards otherwise required by the
fourth amendment. The paradigm customs search involves the routine opening and search
of travelers' luggage, while the paradigm immigration search involves the search of the
trunk of an automobile. This comment does not address the question of the reasonableness
of more intrusive border searches such as strip searches or body cavity probes. These have
been amply discussed in the literature. See, e.g., Ittig, The Rites of Passage: Border
Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 40 TENN. L. REv. 329 (1973); Note, From Bags to
Body Cavities: The Law of Border Search, 74 COLUM. L. REv 53 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Bags to Body Cavities]; Note, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE
L.J. 1007 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Note, Border Searches].
2 See United States v. Alvarez-Gonzalez, 561 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1977), discussed infra
text accompanying notes 27-31.
' See United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 422
U.S. 916 (1975), discussed infra text accompanying notes 32-35.
4 The importance of the definition of a "functional equivalent" of the border is apparent, for example, when one considers the magnitude of the immigration problem. There are
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This comment criticizes the current approaches to functional
border equivalence and suggests an alternative. Part I traces the
development of both the border search exception and the concept
of functional border equivalence. The approaches of the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits are shown to suffer from the Supreme Court's failure to explain sufficiently the underlying purposes of the border
search exception. As a result, the Fifth Circuit defines functional
border equivalence too broadly, the Ninth Circuit too narrowly.
Part II suggests that the border search exception in fact arises out
of the sovereign nation's special interests in activities at its perimeter. At the actual border these interests are sufficiently strong to
overcome any individual interests in privacy and autonomy protected by the fourth amendment.
Part III reformulates functional border equivalence in light of
this understanding. It shows that sovereign and individual interests vary with the location and purpose of the search, and suggests
that a theory of functional border equivalence must balance these
interests in any given context. The comment borrows interestbalancing methodology from the Court's jurisprudence of administrative searches to define what the fourth amendment should require at "distant" border equivalents in the context of immigration
and customs searches. Because sovereign and individual interests
differ in these two situations, the comment concludes that immigration searches at distant border equivalents should be permitted
under reduced probable cause and warrant requirements but that
customs searches require full fourth amendment safeguards.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION AND
THE CONCEPT OF FUNCTIONAL BORDER EQUIVALENCE

A.

The Border Search Exception

The fourth amendment prohibits "unreasonable" searches and
seizures. 5 According to the Supreme Court, a search is always reabetween 10 and 12 million illegal aliens in the United States. In 1983 the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) apprehended over 1.1 million illegal aliens, see U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 91 (1985), about one-quarter of
them at purported functional border equivalents. INS Border Patrol Summary Report (Oct.
1983-Sept. 1984) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review). This required examining approximately 5,489,000 conveyances, including 3,861,000 automobiles, and questioning over 14 million people. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 91.
5 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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sonable when conducted in accordance with a warrant supported
by probable cause." The probable cause requirement provides a
framework for balancing the government's interest in the search,
which depends primarily on the likelihood that it will reveal evidence of unlawful activity, against the individual's interests in privacy and autonomy.7 The warrant requirement ensures that this
balancing is performed by disinterested judicial officers.8 In exceptional circumstances, however, the government's interest may be
strong enough to eliminate the warrant and probable cause
requirements.9

The Supreme Court has held that border searches constitute
such an exceptional circumstance; the historical practice of warrantless searches and their acceptance at the time the Bill of
Rights was adopted indicate that border searches are inherently
"reasonable," and thus exempt from the fourth amendment's probable cause and warrant requirements.10 The acceptance of the border search doctrine is demonstrated by the fact that in 1789 the
first Congress, which proposed the fourth amendment, also enacted
a customs statute authorizing the warrantless search of any ship or
vessel entering the United States.1"
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6

See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Johnson v. United States,

333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
7 See generally Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983) (relaxed standard for deciding
whether informant's tip established probable cause achieves the "accommodation of public
and private interests that the Fourth Amendment requires"); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. 547, 565 (1978) (requirement of probable cause "should afford sufficient protection" of
newspaper's first amendment rights); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (judicial officer must decide "[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of
search").
A Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948); see also Torres v. Puerto Rico,
442 U.S. 465, 471 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655 (1979); Marshall v. Barlow's
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978).
1 Exceptions to the warrant requirement have been "jealously and carefully drawn."
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). Probable cause is generally required, however, both when a warrant is necessary, see, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983),
and even when a warrant may be dispensed with, see, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 807-08 (1982) (automobile search); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970)
(same). In rarer instances, probable cause itself may even be dispensed with. The border
search is one such instance. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977). For
other exceptions, see United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1983)
(probable cause not required for boarding of vessels in certain waters for inspections of
documents); People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 150-51, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100, 104
(1964) (probable cause not required for searches of parolees and probationers); cf. Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967) (probable cause standard relaxed for certain
health, safety, and fire inspections).
10 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-619 (1977).
11 The statute provided:
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On several occasions the Court has hinted at potential rationales for the border search exception which underlie the historical approach. For example, in 1886 the Supreme Court, in dictum,
interpreted the actions of the early Congresses to mean that the
drafters of the fourth amendment did not intend the probable
cause and warrant requirements to reach border searches. 12 In a
later case, the Court suggested a different basis for the exception,
observing that "[t]ravellers may be . . stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self-:protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be
lawfully brought in."'
While these two examples imply that something more than
history lies behind the border search exception, the modern Court
has been content to base its continued approval of the exception
almost entirely on historical grounds without exploring more

That every collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other person specially appointed by
either of them for that purpose, shall have full power and authority, to enter any ship
or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise
subject to duty shall be concealed; and therein to search for; seize, and secure any such
goods, wares or merchandise ...
Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43. The adoption of similar customs laws by the
second and fourth Congresses, see Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, §§ 48-51, 1 Stat. 145, 170; Act
of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, § 27, 1 Stat. 305, 315; Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, §§ 68-71, 1 Stat.
627, 677-78, whose membership also included many of the original framers of the Constitution, further strengthens the argument that border searches have a historical acceptance
equal to that of the fourth amendment.
In contrast, the first federal immigration regulation, which barred convicts and prostitutes, was not enacted until 1875. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477, 477-78.
But cf. Act of Feb. 19, 1862 §§ 2158-64, 18 Stat. 379 (prohibiting importation of Chinese and
Japanese servants). This historical statutory distinction between authority for customs
searches and authority for immigration searches was eliminated in 1971 when federal regulations empowered border agents to enforce both immigration and customs laws. 36 Fed.
Reg. 13,410 (1971). This concurrent authority has been termed the "two hats" doctrine,
United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129, 134 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 919
(1973), and removes any statutory distinctions which might previously have existed between
the customs and immigration search powers.
The current customs statute authorizes searches conducted by the Bureau of Customs
under the supervision of the Treasury Department. The pertinent enforcement provisions
are:
Any of the officers. . . may stop, search, and examine, . . .any vehicle, beast, or person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect there is merchandise which is subject to
duty. . . and to search any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which he may have a
reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which was imported contrary to
law, . . .
19 U.S.C. § 482 (1982); see also 19 C.F.R. 162.5-162.7 (1985).
12 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
13 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
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deeply the government's true underlying interests. Indeed, in
United States v. Ramsey,1 4 an important recent decision on the
exception, the Court emphasized that the "longstanding recognition that searches at our borders without probable cause and without a warrant are nonetheless 'reasonable' has a history as old as
the Fourth Amendment itself."' 5 Although susceptible to criticism,1 6 this historical justification has become the Court's standard
reply to challenges to the border search exception."
B. Functional Border Equivalence
1. Supreme Court Cases. The Supreme Court has also said,
albeit in dicta, that the border search exception may apply to
searches performed away from the actual border at "functional
border equivalents." In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States," the
Court gave two examples:
Whatever the permissible scope of intrusiveness of a routine
border search might be, searches of this kind may in certain
circumstances take place not only at the border itself, but at
its functional equivalents as well. For example, searches at an
established station near the border, at a point marking the
confluence of two or more roads that extend from the border,
might be functional equivalents of border searches. For another example, a search of the passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after a nonstop flight
from Mexico City would clearly be the functional equivalent
of a border search.' 9
The Court did not, however, set forth a principle that relates these
"4431 U.S. 606 (1977).
15Id. at 619 (citation omitted).
" See Note, Beyond the Border of Reasonableness:Exports, Imports and the Border
Search Exception, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 733, 745-52 (1983) (contending that the juxtaposition
of legislative enactment does not justify the abrogation of the fourth amendment since the
customs statute was passed prior to the proposal of the fourth amendment); Note, Border
Searches, supra note 1, at 1011 (arguing that historical standards of reasonableness are not
applicable in a modern context); cf. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv 457, 469
(1897) ("It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV.").
17 See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3309 (1985); Ramsey,
431 U.S. at 616-19; United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125
(1973); United States v. 37 Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376-77 (1971); cf. United States v.
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1983) (approving a seaborne search on the same
basis). But see infra note 38 and accompanying text.
's 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
1 Id. at 272-73 (footnote omitted).
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examples to the border search exception. The Court held only that
the search in the case at hand-a roving patrol on a highway
twenty-five miles from the border-did not fall within the functional border search exception.2 0
Although Almeida-Sanchez contains the Court's only description of places that might qualify as functional border equivalents,
two other cases bear on this issue and suggest the scope of permissible government conduct at near-border locations. In United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte,2 1 the Court approved brief investigatory stops by border patrol agents without probable cause at fixed
checkpoints that were conceded not to be functional border
equivalents.2 2 Probable cause was not necessary, according to the
Court, because the stop entailed only a limited intrusion, resulted
in little stigmatization, and involved relatively little exercise of discretion by the agents.23 Conversely, in United States v. Ortiz, 4 the
Court required probable cause for searches by border patrol agents
25
at checkpoints admitted not to be functional border equivalents,
on the ground that searches are more intrusive than mere stops.
The Court also thought these searches were more stigmatizing than
stops because officers at the checkpoints exercised substantial discretion in singling out which cars to search. 6
These cases provide at least some insight into a theory of
functional border equivalence. In particular, they show that the
probable cause and warrant requirements are necessary for border
zone searches at locations that do not qualify as border
equivalents. Martinez-Fuerteand Ortiz also indicate that such factors as the extent of intrusion, the resulting stigmatization, and the
range of official discretion are relevant to fourth amendment analysis of searches near the border.
2. Circuit Court Approaches. Despite the dicta in AlmeidaSanchez, as well as the hints given in cases like Ortiz and
Martinez-Fuerte, the circuit courts have struggled to interpret
what the Supreme Court's decisions require for lawful searches

20

Id. at 273.

21 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
22

A stop is a brief detention for questioning. Id. at 555-56.

22 Id. at 559-60; cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) (reducing

the general probable cause requirement for stops by holding that to stop a vehicle roving
border patrols need only be aware of specific articulable facts which give rise to a reasonable
suspicion that the vehicle and its contents have entered the country illegally).
24 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
25 Id. at 896-98.
26 Id. at 895-97.
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near the national borders. Although the case law on the border
search exception is well established, the Court's purely historical
approach to the doctrine leaves it largely unexplained. This has
frustrated attempts to extend it to border equivalents through reasoning by analogy. Thus it is unsurprising that the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits have taken quite different approaches to border zone
searches.
The Fifth Circuit's definition of a functional equivalent of the
border has emerged from a series of cases involving checkpoints in
Texas, culminating in United States v. Alvarez-Gonzalez.27 There
the court identified three relevant factors. First, the searches at a
chosen location must be sufficiently unintrusive. This means that
the checkpoint must "'function like a permanent border checkpoint and not like [a] roving border patrol.' ,,28 Only a permanent
checkpoint provides fair notice and warning of its existence, and
reduces the discretion that officials exercise in choosing which travelers to stop and search. Second, the ratio between international
and domestic traffic through the checkpoint must be such that the
interference with domestic traffic is relatively minimal. If the volume of international traffic clearly predominates, all travelers at
the stop can be treated as though they have crossed the border. 29
Finally, to be a functional border equivalent, the checkpoint must
approximate the effect of one located at the border, and therefore
must be capable of monitoring "'portions of international traffic
not otherwise practically controllable.' "o30 This aspect of the test
allows the court both to evaluate the need of the government, for
reasons of efficiency, to establish a checkpoint in a particular location and to consider the success of the checkpoint in apprehending
aliens or confiscating drugs.3 1
.7 561 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1977). The earlier cases included United States v. Hart, 506
F.2d 887 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 1053 (1975), affd per curiam, 525 F.2d
1199 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923 (1976); United States v. Calvillo, 537 F.2d 158
(5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Alvarez-Gonzalez, 542 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally Note, BorderZone Search Law: The Search for a Definition of FunctionalEquivalents
of the Border, 16 T. INTr'L L.J. 260, 264-71 (1981) (examining several Fifth Circuit cases).
8 Alvarez-Gonzalez, 561 F.2d at 622 (quoting United States v. Alvarez-Gonzalez, 542
F.2d 226, 229 (5th Cir. 1976)).
21 561 F.2d at 622-23. For examples of the unrestrictive nature of this requirement, see
infra note 60.
30 561 F.2d at 624 (quoting United States v. Alvarez-Gonzalez, 542 F.2d at 229).
31 In Alvarez-Gonzalez the Fifth Circuit also indicated that the scope of the search is
significant, although it did not consider it a part of the threefold test. Since a full-scale
search for contraband is more intrusive than a search of the large compartments of an automobile for aliens, authorization for a full-scale search might require a reevaluation of
whether a checkpoint was a functional border equivalent. See 561 F.2d at 624-25; Hart, 506
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The Ninth Circuit's approach offers a significantly narrower
definition of functional border equivalence. In United States v.
Bowen, 32 the court defined the "function" of the border search as
the regulation of border crossings. 3 The court indicated that it
considered the examples of functional border equivalents set out
by the Supreme Court in Almeida-Sanchez to be nearly exhaustive. On this basis the court concluded that functional border
equivalence exists only if the "search takes place at a location
where virtually everyone searched has just come from the other
side of the border. 3 4 The court reasoned that since agents exercise
discretion even at fixed checkpoints, the ratio of 5international traf3
fic to domestic traffic should be determinative.
C.

A Critique

The Fifth and Ninth Circuits' different approaches to defining
functional border equivalence indicate a need for a clearer understanding of the purposes of the border search exception. A purely
historical approach, barren of analysis, is too conclusory to support
either circuit's approach.
To illustrate, take the Fifth Circuit's test. One prong of that
test requires functional border equivalents to have a majority of
international traffic. Since history teaches that warrantless
searches of people who have just crossed the border are per se reasonable, it can be argued that the government may conduct a border search at any checkpoint where more than half the traffic is
international. At that checkpoint, the majority percentage of international traffic would make it more probable than not that any one
person or car had recently crossed the border.3 6 This argument
F.2d at 895. Since Alvarez-Gonzalez, however, the Fifth Circuit has abandoned this distinction and included within the scope of permissible searches the routine examination of small
compartments and luggage by border patrol agents. See United States v. Oyarzun, 760 F.2d
570 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Dreyfus-de Campos, 698 F.2d 227, 228-29 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 947 (1983); United States v. Salinas, 611 F.2d 128, 129-31 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Warren, 594 F.2d 1046, 1048 (5th Cir. 1979); cf. United States v.
Cascante-Bernitta, 711 F.2d 36, 37-38 (5th Cir.) (approving a search by a customs agent at
an airport), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 252 (1983). This distinction between searches of large
and small compartments is defended infra at notes 90-92 and accompanying text; see also
United States v. Oyarzun, 582 F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Tex. 1984), rev'd, 760 F.2d 570 (5th
Cir. 1985).
32 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974), afl'd on other grounds, 422 U.S. 916 (1975).
3 Id. at 965.
34 Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 964-65.
30 A similar analysis can be found in the Supreme Court's treatment of "drug courier"
profile cases. Drug courier profiles are a collected group of characteristics that drug enforce-
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would hold that an official has "probable cause" to search every
person and car, regardless of whether they had in fact just crossed
the border.
This argument is flawed, however, because it fails to take into
account the interests of those individuals searched who have not
crossed the border. The border search doctrine stands only for the
proposition that, because of the long history of border searches, all
searches at the border are "reasonable" under the fourth amendment; it is thus not necessary to consider the balance of public and
private interests to determine that any search at the border is lawful. However, because a historical .approach relates only to searches
at the border of individuals who have just crossed the border, it
says nothing about how modern courts should balance government
and private interests when a considerable number of people
searched have not just crossed the border. As the searches move
away from the border, the government's interest in searching international travelers is diluted by the introduction of traffic that is
non-international, and the resulting balance of interests in any
given search might be insufficient to support an exception from the
probable cause and warrant requirements.
The Ninth Circuit's approach is no more compelling because it
undervalues the government's interest in undertaking certain kinds
of searches of international travelers. The fact that traffic at a
checkpoint includes a significant number of domestic travelers
does not eliminate this interest, nor is it clear that the history of
the fourth amendment allows border searches only if "virtually all"
travelers passing through a checkpoint just came from the border.
Officials at a more distant near-border checkpoint might be more
certain than not that a traveler had just crossed the border, but
the Ninth Circuit's definition would prevent them from taking advantage of the border search exception to the fourth amendment.
Again, because a pure historical approach to the border search ex-

ment agents have found to be common among drug couriers traveling in airports. See Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1339 n.6 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The profile may
include such factors as nervous appearance, traveling without luggage, and changing airlines
unnecessarily at a transfer point. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547
n.1 (1980); United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979) (listing eleven
separate characteristics), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980). Although the Court has not directly addressed the use of profiles, a majority apparently would allow them as a method of
establishing the reasonable suspicion required to initiate an investigatory stop of a drug
courier suspect. See Florida v Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (plurality opinion of White,
J., joined by Marshall, Powell and Stevens, JJ.); id. at 523-25 (dissenting opinion of Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and O'Connor, J.); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 563-65 (concurring opinion of Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.).
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ception fails to explain the nature or the magnitude of the government's interest, it provides no basis for assessing this interest once
the search occurs away from the border.
Therefore it appears that although history is thought to justify
border searches, it does not aid in establishing their limits. A statistical measure of "probable cause" is meaningless if the underlying individual and governmental interests remain unexplained and
unmeasured. As a result, the Ninth Circuit's approach errs on the
side of requiring too great a governmental interest before establishing functional border equivalence. And although the Fifth Circuit's approach does attempt to weigh individual and governmental interests, at its outer limits it may label checkpoints as
functional equivalents even though the government's interest is diluted below the level necessary to justify excepting a search from
fourth amendment safeguards.
II.

THE SOVEREIGN INTEREST IN BORDER SEARCHES

As noted previously, even though the Supreme Court now relies primarily upon a historical approach to justify the border
search exception, this approach does not represent the Court's only
statements on the subject.37 In several cases, the Supreme Court
has indicated that what in fact lies behind the historical acceptance of the border search exception is the sovereign interest in
maintaining territorial and national integrity.3 8
The Supreme Court has recognized that principles of sovereignty give the federal government plenary power to regulate immigration. Before The Chinese Exclusion Case,s9 which upheld a
law prohibiting all Chinese from entering the country, the Court
found authority for congressional control of immigration in the foreign commerce clause of the Constitution."° But in that case the
See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
See Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1979) (basing the border search
exception in part on the federal government's "inherent sovereign authority to protect its
territorial integrity"); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (border searches
are made "pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself"); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) (border stops required because of "national selfprotection"). This sovereignty rationale has also been recognized by the lower federal courts.
See, e.g., Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 1484 (11th Cir. 1985) (relaxed constitutional
enforcement at the border based on "the nation's interest in self-determination"); United
States v. Oyarzun, 760 F.2d 570, 574 (5th Cir. 1985) (border search exception justified on the
basis of "sovereign self-protection").
39 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
40 Among Congress's enumerated powers are the powers to "regulate commerce with
foreign nations" and to "establish a uniform rule of naturalization." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
37
38
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Court declared a more fundamental rationale: "Jurisdiction over
its own territory.

. .

is an incident of every independent nation. It

is a part of its independence. If [a nation] could not exclude aliens
it would be to that extent subject to the control of another
' As such, the sovereign's power to exclude foreigners canpower."41
not "be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one."4
As these statements indicate, the sovereign's power over immigration is extremely broad. It includes the power to exclude only
certain classes of immigrants, since it is an "accepted maxim of
international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty,

. . .

to admit [foreigners] only in such cases

and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe."'4 3 Indeed,
"[o]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of44 Congress
more complete than it is over the admission of aliens.

The sovereign also has an inherent power to regulate foreign
commerce by regulating customs, by enacting duties and tariffs,
and by other means. 45 The principle of sovereign rights was first
46 where the
applied to customs collections in Cross v. Harrison,
Court stated:

It is very well understood to be a part of the laws of nations,
that each nation may designate, upon its own terms, the ports
and places within its territory for foreign commerce, and that
cls. 3, 4; see The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 591-94 (1884) (reviewing cases establishing that Congress has the exclusive power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, including the transportation of immigrants).
4! The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 603-04, quoted in Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 291 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
"2 130 U.S. at 609. For a criticism of such an absolute vision of this power, see Note,
Constitutional Limits on the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 CoLum. L. REv. 957 (1982).
43 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); see also Act of March 3,
1875, ch. 1, § 5, 18 Stat. 477, 477-78 (the first federal immigration statute, which excluded
only prostitutes and convicts); 2 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS §§ 94,
100 (4th ed. London 1811) (1st ed. London 1758) (the right to prohibit or condition entrance
into a territory stems from the rights and domain of sovereignty).
44 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v.
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)).
This broad power was also noted in the Eleventh Circuit's recent opinion in Garcia-Mir
v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1985). There, the court rejected the claims of the "Mariel
Boatlift" Cubans that they possessed constitutional rights that were infringed by their continued detention, and held that the "contours" of the Cubans' rights were largely left to
legislative discretion. The court stated: "As the history of its immigration policy makes
clear, this nation has long maintained as a fundamental aspect of its right to self-determination the prerogative to determine whether, and in what numbers, outsiders without any
cognizable connection to this society shall be permitted to join it." Id. at 1484.
45 See supra note 11.
46 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164 (1853).
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any attempt to introduce foreign goods elsewhere, within its
47
jurisdiction, is a violation of its sovereignty.
The powers to control immigration and foreign commerce are
members of a class of similar powers that inhere in the sovereign
nature of the federal government even though they are not enumerated in the Constitution.4 8 In the classic case, United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,49 the Court acknowledged that certain powers necessary to the sovereignty of a nation had not been
specifically delegated to the federal government by the Constitution. 50 It then noted that since the states themselves were never
sovereigns possessing external foreign powers, they could not have
been the source of the federal government's external powers.
Rather, the powers of external sovereignty are inherent and
unenumerated powers that passed to the federal government from
the British Crown via the confederation government.5 1 The Court
has indicated that this class of unenumerated powers may be exercised as broadly as the other powers expressly granted to the fed52
eral government.
17 Id. at 196; see also 1 E. VATML, supra note 43, §§ 90, 92 (sovereign states, as of
natural right, may prohibit and regulate their foreign commerce).
48 See, e.g., Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1821 (1984) (extraconstitutional nature of exclusion power); Note, supra note 42, at 966-74

(same).
49 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
50 Id. at 318. Examples of other unenumerated powers include the power to recognize
foreign governments and the power to acquire territory by treaty. See generally Louis HENKIN, EpREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 16-17 (1972).
' Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315-17. Although the historical basis of the view that the
states were never individual sovereigns has been strongly criticized, see, e.g., HENKIN, supra
note 50, at 284 n.10; Note, supra note 42, at 969-74 and authorities cited therein, the doctrine of extratextual foreign powers remains authoritative, see Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S.
44, 57 (1958) ("The States that joined together to form a single Nation and to create,
through the Constitution, a Federal Government to conduct the affairs of that Nation must
be held to have granted that Government the powers indispensable to its functioning effectively in the company of sovereign nations."), overruled on other grounds, Afroyim v. Rusk,
387 U.S. 253 (1967); United States v. Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197, 1200 (3d Cir. 1984) (categorizing the right to regulate the border as an inherent power of sovereignty which passed to
the United States upon the cessation of the exercise of sovereignty by Great Britain).
52 Where sovereign powers do not infringe on the rights of American citizens the Court
has found virtually no limit to their exercise. For example, the Court has recognized that the
power to acquire territory by treaty, a nontextual power, includes the power to negotiate
treaties whose provisions, if applied to the states rather than to the territories, would be
unconstitutional. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 253-57 (1901); id. at 345-46 (Gray, J.,
concurring). But see id. at 288-89 (White, J., concurring). The Court has treated the power
to acquire territory by treaty or war as practically absolute. See American Ins. Co. v. Canter,
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828); cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (ruling
that treaty provisions are not subject to the same tenth amendment restrictions as acts of
Congress since the power to deal by treaty with matters requiring national action is one
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When applied to the fourth amendment, the notion of sovereign powers makes sense of the border search exception. The federal government's power over immigration and foreign commerce is
immense, and the nation's border is the primary locus at which
that power must be exercised. The border search exception should
be seen as recognizing that the government's sovereign interests at
the actual border are so strong that they always outweigh the individual's privacy and autonomy interests in avoiding "unreasonable" searches. 3 It is not obvious, however, that sovereign interests
so clearly outweigh individual interests when the searches occur
away from the border and may include individuals who have not
just crossed the border. Functional border equivalence, then, becomes a matter of determining how those competing interests
change away from the actual border.

which must "'somewhere reside in every civilized government' ") (quoting Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 33 (1903)). But cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (holding that no
treaty can "confer power . . . on any . . . branch of government which is free from the
restraints of the constitution").
Even when the exercise of the sovereign power may infringe on the rights of American
citizens, so long as the infringement occurs outside the United States the sovereign right has
not been greatly limited. Thus, the Court has upheld Congress's power to institute taxation
schemes for the territories which would be unconstitutional if applied to the states. See, e.g.,
Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 323 (1937); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244, 287 (1901). Congress may also determine the status of territorial inhabitants, see
Rabang v. Boyd, 353 U.S. 427, 432 (1957); Downes, 182 U.S. at 279, possibly denying them
some of the protections of the Bill of Rights, see Downes, 182 U.S. at 277, 283. But see, e.g.,
Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1 (1982) (extending constitutional voting
rights protection to Puerto Rican citizens). In addition, the Court has gone so far as to deem
the power to govern territories acquired by treaty or conquest has been deemed to include
the right to govern the reconstructed states so as to prevent a recurrence of insurrection.
See Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 506 (1870). In Stewart, a provision of an ex
post facto federal statute that abrogated Louisiana's statute of limitations was upheld as an
exercise of the war power, though it bore no clear relation to the prevention of rebellion. Id.
53 Several commentators have argued that the fourth amendment's warrant requirement should apply to intrusive body searches at the border, see, e.g., Note, Bags to Body
Cavities, supra note 1, at 82-87, but none has gone so far as to suggest that the border
search exception itself be done away with. However, other fourth amendment doctrines
whose original justifications gradually were submerged in favor of a historical argument
have not been immune to Supreme Court reappraisal. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 528-34 (1967) (requiring administrative search warrants), overruling Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (which approved warrantless administrative searches on historical grounds); cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967) (approving fourth
amendment protection of phone conversations), altering Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928) (which limited the scope of fourth amendment protection to objects within
the historical trespass doctrine). This comment's recognition of an underlying sovereignty
rationale precludes such a reappraisal of the border search exception.
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APPLYING THE SOVEREIGNTY RATIONALE TO FUNCTIONAL
BORDER EQUIVALENTS

A. The Special Problem of Distant Border Searches
In order to determine how a sovereignty-based approach to
border searches relates to functional border equivalence, it is useful to classify near-border searches into two categories: virtual border searches and distant border searches. A virtual border search
occurs at a location through which all or almost all of the traffic
has just crossed the border. A distant border search occurs at a
location where a significant portion of the traffic has just crossed
the border. These two categories correspond to the tests adopted
by the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, respectively.
With regard to virtual border searches, the recognition that
the government's border interests are sovereignty-based indicates
that these searches, like actual border searches, should be exempt
from fourth amendment requirements. The circumstances at a virtual border are nearly identical to those at the actual border. 4 Because practically all the people searched at the virtual border have
just crossed the border, the sovereign has the same interest in
searching them as it would if the searches were conducted at the
actual border.5 5 A virtual border search, in fact, is almost identical
to the international flight example used by the Supreme Court in
Almeida-Sanchez.

In contrast, the overinclusiveness of distant border searches,
which results from the significant amount of non-international
traffic, changes the fourth amendment balance in two ways: it dilutes the government's interest in a search of any given individual,
and it increases the possibility and extent of damage to an individ54 Virtual border searches are by definition confined to areas where there are virtually
no searches of noninternational travelers. Such a variation from the conventional concept of
border searches can only be considered de minimis. Even the more restrictive Ninth Circuit
has readily recognized that the factors involved in border searches change very little if the
search is conducted close to the border. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
55 This is also the case when surveillance establishes with reasonable certainty that a
particular vehicle has crossed the border and has not since had an opportunity to load or
unload. In such cases, courts have permitted a search of the vehicle without a warrant or
probable cause as if it had been stopped at the border. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States,
362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966); cf. United States v. Brennan,
538 F.2d 711, 721 (5th Cir. 1976) (allowing search of plane after surveillance following border crossing), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092 (1977). Failure to maintain surveillance defeats the
presumption that conditions in the vehicle have not changed. See, e.g., Contreras v. United
States, 291 F.2d 63, 65 (9th Cir. 1961). But see United States v. Terry, 446 F.2d 579, 581-82
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 946 (1971) (allowing brief breaks in surveillance); Alexander, 362 F.2d at 582-83 (same).
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dal's privacy and autonomy interests resulting from the search. 6
Clearly, the government's interest in any one search at a distant
border checkpoint is lower than at a virtual border checkpoint. At
a distant border, agents can hardly avoid searching many domestic
travelers in whom the government has no special sovereigntyrelated interest whatsoever.
Moreover, the negative effects of government intrusions upon
individuals are greater at distant border locations than at an actual
border. Actual borders have an international legal status" that
puts travelers on notice that searches are likely to be made. This
notice diminishes the travelers' expectation of privacy and may
make it reasonable to presume that they implicitly have consented
to a warrantless search upon their reentry into the country.5 8 The
expectation that a search may occur also makes border searches
less insulting and stigmatizing, thereby mitigating the injury they
cause. 59
Unlike actual borders, however, distant border equivalents
have no international legal status. Distant checkpoints may be set
up at sites where a substantial number of the people passing
through the checkpoint have not crossed the international border.6 0 These distant checkpoints do not clearly give notice that
limited warrantless searches may occur. Travelers who have not
crossed the border thus cannot be thought to have given their implied consent to warrantless searches merely by traveling near the
border.6 1 When singled out for search the individual may feel in-

56

See supra text following note 36 and text accompanying note 28.

See BERNARD GILSON, THE CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY 181-84
(1984); see also United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) ("searches made at the
border, pursuant to the long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself. . . are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border"). See generally B. GLSON,
supra, at 151-181 (discussing the concept of a border).
" See Note, Almeida-Sanchez and its Progeny: The Developing Border Zone Search
Law, 17 ARiz. L. REV. 214, 238 n.149 (1975). See generally Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 222-27 (1973) (setting forth the basic doctrine that consent is an exception to the
need for a warrant).
59 Note, Border Searches, supra note 1, at 1012.
"0 In United States v. Alvarez-Gonzalez, 561 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1977), for example, the
fact that only 60% of the traffic was international was nonetheless sufficient to establish
"minimal interference with domestic traffic" within the Fifth Circuit's test. Id. at 623. In
United States v. Luddington, 589 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 936 (1979), the
court held that a checkpoint was a functional border equivalent even though no statistical
evidence as to the percentage of international traffic was presented and despite the concession that "as a matter of sheer volume, the effect of the checkpoint on domestic traffic [was]
significant." Id. at 241.
6' See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 281 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) ("One who merely travels in regions near the borders of the country can hardly be
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sulted and stigmatized, since the selection often will not reflect justified suspicion.
In sum, when viewed in light of the government's strong sovereign interests, warrantless searches at virtual border equivalents
seem permissible, and indeed can sensibly be categorized as falling
within the border search exception itself. But searches at distant
border checkpoints present special problems because of their overinclusiveness. A theory of functional border equivalence must balance the negative effects of this overinclusiveness against the sovereign's special interests in conducting such searches.
B. An Analogy to Administrative Searches
Because neither the Supreme Court nor any other court has
rigorously analyzed functional border equivalence in light of sovereign national interests, it is appropriate to look elsewhere in fourth
amendment law to find a framework for balancing the competing
individual and governmental interests. Such a framework can be
found in the Court's decisions relating to administrative searches.
In that area the Court has created a category of intermediate
fourth amendment protection for searches that are overinclusive
but effectuate strong government interests.
In Camara v. Municipal Court,62 the Court ruled that a warrant is generally required for searches made by government officials to determine compliance with administrative regulations.63
Although the Court acknowledged that administrative searches
were a less hostile intrusion than a typical police search for criminal evidence, it reasoned that the public interest in regulating
health and safety did not justify dispensing with the need for a
warrant.6 4 Only if requiring a warrant would "frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search" may officials conduct administrative searches without a warrant.6 5
Consideration of the public interest did, however, lead the
Court to relax the probable cause requirements that must be satisthought to have submitted to inspections in exchange for a special perquisite."); cf. Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (reaffirming the right to freedom of travel within
the United States).
2 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
63 Id. at 534. Administrative searches involve inspections for the purpose of determining compliance with a "regulatory scheme for the general welfare of the community." Frank
v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959).
387 U.S. at 530-33.
"8Id. at 533.
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fled before an administrative search warrant could be issued. 68
General area inspection warrants could be issued upon "probable
cause" standards that are less stringent than those required to obtain a warrant for a criminal search.67 The standard of probable
cause for any given search was held to vary with the nature of the
regulatory program. 8
The Court justified this modified warrant system by its assessment of the magnitude of governmental and individual interests
peculiar to administrative searches. The Court found the government's interest in such searches to be unusually strong. This interest was illustrated by the historical, judicial, and public acceptance
of the practice of administrative inspections, and by general notions that the public interest is served by their performance.69 The
extent of intrusion on the individual, on the other hand, was found
to be fairly low. These searches create a largely impersonal invasion and are not aimed at uncovering evidence of crime.70
Camara marks the fourth amendment protections required at
one point on a continuum that balances individual and governmental interests. In other cases the Court has created limited exceptions to Camara'sgeneral warrant system where the governmental
interest involved was particularly strong and the type of intrusion
caused by the search especially slight. If the inspections are regular
and certain, pervasively monitored, or such that a warrant requirement would frustrate legitimate government enforcement goals, no
71
warrant is required.

e Id. at 534-39.
67 Id. at 538. Area warrants permit the general inspection of all places or things specified within a geographical region, "based on [an] appraisal of conditions in the area as a
whole, not on . . . knowledge of [the] conditions of each particular" place or thing. Id. at
536. But see See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 552-55 (1967) (Clark, J., dissenting). For
example, the Court suggested in Camara that the mere passage of time without inspection
might be sufficient to justify the issuance of a warrant. 387 U.S. at 538.
68 387 U.S. at 538.
69 Id. at 537.
70 Id.
7' These exceptions are gleaned from a relatively unclear line of Supreme Court cases
following Camara. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970), for
example, the Court emphasized that because the liquor business was an industry long subject to regulation and licensing requirements, Congress had broad power to specify the kinds
of warrantless inspections that would be permitted. In contrast, in United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972), the Court upheld a warrantless inspection of a federally licensed
gun dealer even though there was no strong history of federal regulation. The Court instead
stressed a consent rationale, arguing that "[w]hen a dealer chooses to engage in [a] pervasively regulated business . . . he does so with the knowledge that [he] will be subject to
effective inspection." Id. at 316. In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 324-25 (1978),
however, the Court held that industrial inspections by the Occupational Safety and Health
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In addition to relaxed probable cause requirements, the administrative search doctrine also acknowledges that some search
warrants may be issued even though the object of the search is not
described with the particularity normally required by the fourth
amendment. In the administrative search area, if the public interest is strong enough, the intrusion upon individuals minimal, and
the major purpose of the search is not to expose individuals to
criminal prosecution, then the Court will approve a general area
search warrant that is overinclusive in order to promote72 the efficient enforcement of the government's regulatory plans.

C. The Administrative Search and the Distant Border
Applying administrative search jurisprudence to distant border searches requires an examination of the interests of the sovereign and the individual. The relative weight of these interests will
vary with the purpose and the intrusiveness of the search. This
variation means that functional border equivalence should be defined in the context of particular kinds of searches.
1. Distinguishing Immigration and Customs Searches. The
government stops and searches individuals at border zone checkpoints primarily for two purposes: to enforce the immigration laws
and to enforce the customs laws. 3 But the government's interests
Administration (OSHA) could not be conducted without a warrant. The Court explained
that the Colonnade and Biswell exceptions were limited to those industries which were both
pervasively regulated and had a long tradition of government supervision. The rationale for
these exceptions was that only participants in an activity which is widely and historically
regulated can be deemed to have given their implied consent to the warrantless inspection.
Id. at 313-14. In a further shift of emphasis, the Court in Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594,
603-06 (1981), permitted the warrantless inspection of mines by federal officials, and emphasized the certainty and regularity with which the searches occurred. The Court indicated
that the flaw of the OSHA regulation in Marshall was that, unlike the mine inspection
statute in Donovan, it gave too much discretion to the OSHA inspectors to determine when
and whom to search. Id. at 601.
"2Camara,387 U.S. at 537; see Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 121 n.11 (1977)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that regulatory searches and border searches are the two
best known exceptions to the particularity requirements of the fourth amendment); United
States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973) ("The essence of these decisions [of the
Supreme Court] is that searches conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, rather than as part of a criminal investigation to
secure evidence of crime, may be permissible under the Fourth Amendment though not
supported by a showing of probable cause directed to a particular place or person to be
searched.").
73 "Immigration law" is used to mean the body of law governing the admission and
deportation of aliens, and should be distinguished from the more general law of aliens'
rights and obligations. See Legomsky, ImmigrationLaw and the Principleof Plenary CongressionalPower, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 255, 256. "Customs law" is used to mean the body of
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differ in the two contexts.
The government has a fundamental interest in enforcing its
immigration laws through border-zone searches. Immigration laws
are uniquely important because a state is defined by its members
and their agreement to form it.74 Membership in a specific community or state is the "central concept of politics"; 5 the identity of
the members of a community is critical to the political embodiment of that community.7"
Recognition of the critical nature of the sovereign's interest in
immigration is evident in early English common law. In Calvin's
Case7 it was recognized that a person born alien could be made a
subject only by the "denization" of the King. The power to grant
citizenship was considered so inextricably bound up with the sovereign's high prerogative that it could not be delegated. 8
This conception of citizenship and nationality carried over
into the late eighteenth century, when European philosophers attempted to categorize the natural law. Vattel argued that the right
to prohibit entry into the country stemmed directly from the rights
and domain of the sovereign.7 e This domain included the right to
condition entry of an alien in any manner the sovereign saw fit.s0
law regulating the admission of goods and articles into the country. See United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-619 (1977).
7' See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 63 (C. Sherman ed. 1937) (1st ed.
London 1658) (the only way whereby anyone may divest himself of his natural liberty and
join a civil society is by "agreeing with other men to join and unite in a community [and
thereby] make one body politic"); P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT.
ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 22-31 (1985); cf. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
Bk. VIH, chs. i, ix (Browne trans. London 1853) (discussing the importance of unanimity
and friendship for success of community).
71 Friedrich, The Concept of Community in the History of Politicaland Legal Philosophy, in COMMUNIrY 20 (Nomos No. 2, C. Friedrich ed. 1959); ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Bk. III,
ch. iii, §§ 7-12 (Barker trans. 1946) (basic identity of polis defined by its membership).
7 Many of the framers were troubled by the problem of maintaining an essential homogeneity in the growing population of the nation. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 38-39 (J.
Jay) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VMrGINI, Query
VIII, at 83-85 (W. Peden ed. 1954). See generally ALFmUS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 32-40 (J. Mayer ed. 1969) (discussing common features and differences among the
early American colonists).
1 77 7 Coke Rep. la, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (1608). For an in-depth analysis of Calvin's Case,
see P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, supra note 74, at 12-17.
78 Calvin's Case, 7 Coke Rep. at 18a, 25b. Sovereign control of immigration may also be
accomplished by statute. In 1645, Massachusetts passed the first American immigration law
prohibiting the immigration of the indigent and poor. EDWARD P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY

1798-1965, at 390 (1981). The Supreme Court

has since ruled that the Constitution preempts state regulation or taxation of immigrants.
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875).
7' See E. VATTEL, supra note 43, § 94.
80 Id. § 100.
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The power of exclusion was particularly important because, upon
the alien's entry, the sovereign undertook the duty to protect
him.8 ' Thus, according to natural law theorists, the sovereign had
to consent to the undertaking of his natural law obligations; they
could not be thrust upon him. 2
The practice of international law has followed this natural law
conception of sovereign powers. Roman citizenship could be extended only by edict of the sovereign. 3 Similarly, modern international law tribunals have followed the principle that a state has the
power to declare who are its nationals.8 4 This includes the power to
deny foreigners the right to enter the country. Since it is through
the standard of nationality that the granting of rights and the undertaking of binding obligations by a state is measured internationally, the conveyance of citizenship lies wholly within the do85
mestic jurisdiction of each state.
The importance of the sovereign interest in immigration is
also evident in the great deference that the Supreme Court has
accorded the federal government's power over immigration. The
Court has held that regulation of immigration is solely a federal
power,"6 and has allowed the federal government latitude to take
81

Id. § 104.

See 2 JEAN JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW 31
(5th ed. Cambridge 1807) (1st ed. Geneva 1748); cf. 2 SIR ROBERT J. PHILIMORE, COMMEN82

TARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-7 (3d ed. 1882); United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972) (discussing sovereign duties in the law enforcement context,
the Court stated, "unless Government safeguards its own capacity. . . to preserve the security of its people. . . all rights and liberties would be endangered.. . . 'Civil liberties...
imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order.' ") (quoting Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1971)).
83 See B. GILSON, supra note 57, at 105. The Roman law of jus gentium is generally
recognized as the source of modern international law. Id. at 7-8.
84 Id. at 107; see Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, 1923 P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 4
(Advisory Opinion of Feb. 7).
85 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) 1955 I.C.J. 4, 20 (Judgment of Apr. 6)
("it is for every sovereign State to settle ... the rules relating to acquisition of its nationality, and to confer that nationality ... by its own organs").
88 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280-81 (1875). The Court has also acknowledged
the greater federal power over aliens' rights and obligations. Whereas state restrictions on
welfare payments, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971), or state public employment, Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641-46 (1973), available to aliens have been found
to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Court in Mathews
v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-80 (1976), expressly acknowledged Congress's power to make rules
concerning aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens. Mathews upheld a rule
which denied Medicare benefits to aliens who had not been admitted to and resided in the
United States for five years. Id. at 83-87. Similarly, while states may only limit the public
employment of aliens in those instances where the special demands of the position require
citizenship, see Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647, in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88
(1976), the Court acknowledged in dicta that the "paramount federal power over immigra-
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certain actions in the immigration context that would not be al87
lowed in other contexts.
In comparison to this sovereign interest in immigration, the
government's interest in customs enforcement appears less fundamental. Customs regulation controls only the objects that enter the
nation's geographical boundary; immigration control enforces the
identity of citizenship which makes the geographical boundary
meaningful in the first place. Because citizenship "defines" the
sovereign in a democracy, the very power to make decisions about
customs control depends upon an enforceable definition of citizenship. Perhaps in recognition of this, the Supreme Court has ensured the federal government an almost limitless monopoly over
the admission of aliens, 88 while it has not been so troubled by state
customs regulations."9 Though both immigration and customs law

tion . . .forecloses a simple extension" of the prohibition applied to the states and that
"overriding national interests may provide a justification for a citizenship requirement in
the federal service even though an identical requirement may not be enforced by a State."
Id. at 100-01.
87 In Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 791-92 (1977), the Court held that Congress could give
a preference in immigration to illegitimate children whose mothers were citizens without
giving a similar preference based on the father's citizenship. Such a distinction, if applied to
citizens outside the immigration context, would surely be invalidated on equal protection
grounds. Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (striking down an Illinois law that presumed the parental unfitness of unwed fathers but not that of unwed mothers). Additionally, in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 767-70 (1972), the Court upheld the government's decision to deny a visa to a journalist because of his Marxist views, despite its
recognition that the denial implicated the first amendment interests of American citizens
who wished to meet with the journalist. See also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
Although one commentator recently has criticized this "special deference [the Court]
has accorded Congress in the field of immigration," Legomsky, supra note 73, at 255, the
Court has not deviated from its deferential policy. Another author draws tangential support
for the belief that Congress's immigration powers are waning slightly from the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), which invalidated a state statute that denied free public education to the children of undocumented aliens. See Schuck,
supra note 48, at 54-58. This reliance is misplaced, however, since the Court in Plyler did no
more than invalidate a state statutory limitation on aliens, while it cited with approval Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), and continued to acknowledge Congress's plenary power
over the immigration field. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210-26.
88 See supra note 86 and text accompanying note 44.
89 In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367-73 (1959), the Court noted the long history
of state and local customs regulations. Other courts have also recognized the states' customs powers. In rejecting a fourth amendment challenge to a search conducted at an inspection station, the California Court of Appeals did not draw any distinction between federal
and state authority to conduct customs border searches. See People v. Dickinson, 104 Cal.
App. 3d 505, 509-13, 163 Cal. Rptr. 575, 577-79 (1980) (approving a search conducted pursuant to state law when the defendant complied with a request that he open his trunk); cf.
State v. Bailey, 120 Ariz. 399, 401, 586 P.2d 648, 649-50 (Ct. App. 1978) (approving a similar
stop and search by a quarantine inspector at an agricultural inspection station pursuant to
Arizona law). A state's control over the goods that cross its borders (so long as such control
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arise out of the sovereign power of a nation to control its borders,
the control of immigration emerges as a significantly more important aspect of that power.
With regard to individual interests recognized by the Camara
framework, immigration searches are also less intrusive than custons searches. At one time, the Fifth Circuit determined that
searches of luggage and compartments too small to hold illegal
aliens represented a "more serious interference [which] could well
result in the striking of a different balance in determining a checkpoint's status as the functional equivalent of the border, since the
degree of intrusion clearly bears on that status."9 0 This distinction
correctly recognized the difference between immigration searches
of large impersonal areas, such as the trunk of a car, and customs
searches of smaller, more intimate places like a glove compartment
or a piece of luggage. The nature of the objects kept in the respective places differs substantially.91 Although the Fifth Circuit has
abandoned this distinction,9 2 it should be revived within the

does not interfere with interstate commerce), is as much an aspect of the state's sovereignty
as it is of the federal government's. But see, e.g., Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that a state restriction on the
transportation of nuclear waste violates the commerce and supremacy clauses), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 913 (1983).
Examples of states exercising customs power abound. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAW
§ 385(1)-(16) (McKinney 1979) (authorizing state inspection of vehicles entering the state to
ensure that they satisfy size and weight regulations); FLA. STAT. § 601.29(2) (West Supp.
1985) (authorizing state inspectors to enter and examine vehicles for compliance with citrus
packing regulations). Perhaps the one incident in which a state exercised a power most
closely parallel to the national customs power was California's use of a quarantine in the
wake of the Mediterranean fruit fly outbreak. California law authorizes the state to establish
a quarantine and enforce it by maintaining inspection stations. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE
§§ 5301, 5341 (West 1968). Failure to stop and present any plants or quarantined items
upon request is unlawful. Id. at §§ 5344, 5346 (West 1968 & Supp. 1985).
90 United States v. Alvarez-Gonzalez, 561 F.2d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 1977); see also United
States v. Hart, 506 F.2d 887, 895 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 1053 (1975),
aff'd per curiam, 525 F.2d 1199, cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923 (1976).
"' This distinction is not exact. Some drugs, such as large bales of marijuana, may be
concealed only in large compartments of an automobile. It is, however, unlikely that a glove
compartment will conceal an illegal alien. Cf. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13
(1977) (holding that lower expectations of privacy attach to an automobile than to personal
luggage). A useful analogy may be drawn to the use of an arrest warrant to search a house
for a criminal suspect. The search permitted under the arrest warrant is limited to large
areas where the suspect may be hiding and does not include personal containers or drawers.
See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
92 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. This probably reflects the Fifth Circuit's
understanding that the government's interest in permitting customs searches is the same as
its interest in permitting immigration searches. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
To the extent that the Fifth Circuit's abandonment of the distinction rests on this belief, it
is flawed. See supra notes 73-89 and accompanying text. Nothing precludes the Fifth Circuit
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framework of the administrative search analogy.
In addition, immigration and customs searches differ with respect to the severity of the possible consequences of the search.
Violations of the customs laws carry clear criminal penalties.9 3 Indeed, a common customs violation, possession of narcotics, frequently results in stiff jail sentences.94 In contrast, the primary
sanction for violations of federal immigration laws is deportation, 5
which has long been considered a civil punishment and not a criminal sanction. 96
In sum, the balance of governmental and individual interests
differs considerably in the contexts of immigration and customs
searches. Immigration searches, unlike customs searches, exhibit
characteristics analogous to the factors developed in Camara,
which justified lower fourth amendment standards for nonparticularized, overinclusive administrative searches: they further a fundamental government interest, are not overly intrusive, and in the
vast majority of cases result only in civil punishment. This suggests that immigration searches at distant border equivalents
should be exempt from the full probable cause requirements of the
fourth amendment, while customs searches at distant border
equivalents should receive no such special treatment.
2. Warrants for distant border searches. Application of the
administrative search analogy to immigration searches at distant
border equivalents also suggests that no distant border search

from adopting a sovereignty interest rationale and reinstituting a distinction between immigration searches of large spaces and customs searches of small spaces.
93 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C § 541 (1982) (up to two-year prison term for entry of falsely classified goods); id. § 545 (up to five-year prison term for smuggling).
$, The two states whose checkpoints have been most closely examined by the courts,
Texas and California, have particularly harsh laws. See, e.g., TEXAs STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15,
§ 4.03 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (up to life imprisonment for sale of specified quantities of certain controlled substances); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 11352(a) (West Supp. 1985)
(five-year to life prison term for sale of specified controlled substances).
"s Federal law provides for deportation of illegal aliens, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227, 1252 (1982),
and criminal sanctions against both illegal aliens, id. §§ 1325-26, and those who transport
them into the country, id. §§ 1321-24, 1327-28. Of the more than 1.1 million people apprehended for violating the immigration laws in 1983, however, only 16,493 were prosecuted,
less than 2% of those arrested. STATIsTIcAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrTED STATES, supra note 4,
at 90-91. The ensuing 11,233 convictions resulted in aggregate fines of $503,000 and imprisonment for a total of 5,451 years. Id. at 90. Thus, on average, a successful prosecution resulted in a punishment of a $50 fine and 6 months imprisonment.
9' See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 668 (1977); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S.
585, 591 (1913) (Holmes, J.) (deportation is not a "punishment; it is simply a refusal by the
Government to harbor persons whom it does not want"). But see Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580, 600 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (likening deportation to banishment);
Schuck, supra note 48, at 24-27 (contending that deportation is not merely a civil penalty).
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should be allowed unless it is authorized by an area search war-

rant.9 7 Administrative search warrants may only be dispensed with
when inspections are regular and certain, where they are made in
areas of pervasive regulation, or where a warrant requirement
would frustrate enforcement goals.98 An examination of searches at
distant equivalents of the border indicates that they do not fall

within any of these exceptions: searches at distant border checkpoints are irregular and uncertain, only a small percentage of people at each checkpoint are searched,99 many distant border stations

are not permanently manned, and decisions about whom and when
to search necessarily involve considerable discretion by border patrol agents. 10 0

97 In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270-72 (1973), the Court rejected
the contention that the administrative search doctrine supported the constitutionality of
warrantless roving border patrol searches. The Court stressed that driving an automobile
near the border is not a pervasively regulated activity where the nature of the activity gives
rise to an expectation that a search will occur. Id. at 271-72. The Court also noted that there
is no certainty that the people being searched have engaged in the suspected activity that
gives rise to the search authority, since not all people near the border have crossed it. Id.
However, the Court quite clearly left open the possibility that the administrative search
doctrine would be sufficient to permit some interior border searches under an area warrant.
See id. at 270 & n.3 (plurality opinion); id. at 283-85 (Powell, J., concurring) (suggesting the
use of area warrants); id. at 288 (White, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Powell).
9 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
9' United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975); United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp.
398, 412-15 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
200 See Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 895-96; cf. Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978)
(warrant required under the Occupational Safety and Health Act in order to protect against
the administrative officers' "almost unbridled discretion. . . as to when to search and whom
to search"). It is not clear, however, that a random search on the highway at a fixed checkpoint involves a constitutionally excessive amount of discretion. See, e.g., Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (suggesting that warrantless license check stops by police at
fixed checkpoints might be constitutional); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 541-42, 673 P.2d
1174, 1184-85 (1983) (approving warrantless drunk driving checkpoints); State v. Coccomo,
177 N.J. Super. 575, 581-84, 427 A.2d 131, 134-35 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) (approving
warrantless license checks of every fifth car to pass through a fixed police checkpoint); People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 414-15, 330 N.E.2d 39, 40, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 69 (1975) ("absent
reasonable suspicion of a vehicle violation . . . [warrantless license checks are] permissible
only when conducted according to nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory, uniform procedures for
detecting violations"); cf. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974) (approving airport metal detector searches); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir.
1973) (same).
Some states have invalidated warrantless checkpoints when officers operating them had
been given too much discretion, without rejecting the propriety of such stops altogether.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 5, 663 P.2d 992, 996 (1983);
Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 144, 449 N.E.2d 349, 353 (1983); State v.
Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 (1985) (en banc) (striking down police spot
checks of vehicles to examine licenses, registrations, and equipment as vesting too much
discretion in the patrolmen). In South Dakota, police cannot establish a checkpoint to identify drunk drivers without first obtaining a warrant. State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392 (S.D.
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In addition, the requirement of a warrant for immigration
searches at distant border stations is not likely to frustrate governmental interests. Aliens will not try to enter the country more
often if the government must receive judicial approval for distant
border searches, nor will it be difficult for the government to obtain an area warrant. This is particularly true if the judicial scrutiny occurs before a checkpoint is established. Once a determination has been made that a certain location meets the investigatory
needs of the government without undue intrusion on private interests, there is no need to reevaluate the checkpoint continually. The
circumstances which made it an acceptable location do not change
rapidly over time. 10 1
Moreover, it would also be possible to relax the probable cause
requirement, as has been done with administrative searches. 0 2 The
standards by which a judge or magistrate would evaluate a request
for an area warrant are easily discernible and not difficult to establish. Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Almeida-Sanchez suggests some possibilities:
(i) the frequency with which aliens illegally in the country are
known or reasonably believed to be transported within a particular area; (ii) the proximity of the area in question to the
border; (iii) the extensiveness and geographic characteristics
of the area, including the roads therein and the extent of their
use; and (iv) the probable degree of interference with the
rights of innocent persons, taking into account the scope of
the proposed search, its duration, and the concentration of illegal alien traffic in relation to the general traffic of the road
10 3
or area.
Given the strength of the government's interest in immigration
searches at distant functional border equivalents, the judge or
magistrate should also consider the extent to which the proposed
search will help to vindicate the government's obligation to maintain the nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity by preventing
illegal border crossings. 104
1976).
101 Cf. United States v. Dreyfus-de Campos, 698 F.2d 227, 229 (5th Cir.) (declining to

reevaluate a functional border equivalent without a demonstration of changed circumstances), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 947 (1983).
102 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
,o3 Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 283-84 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
4o' One necessary difference between the warrant process for distant border searches
and that for administrative searches lies in the scope of the judicial function. Camaradid
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These factors taken together provide a suitable framework in
which to balance the sovereign interest in enforcing immigration
laws against the overinclusive nature of the search. Allowing immigration searches at distant border equivalents, but only with prior
judicial scrutiny, provides sufficient checks to prevent the abuse of
fourth amendment rights by border patrol agents yet permits the
105
maintenance of territorial sovereignty.
CONCLUSION

Border searches have a long history of public and judicial acceptance. On this historical basis alone, border searches have been
found exempt from the fourth amendment's prohibition against
"unreasonable" searches. Yet the constitutional limitations on
"border" searches that are conducted within the interior of the
country at functional border equivalents remain undefined. A pure
historical rationale for the border search exception provides no
guidance; instead, principled limits upon searches at border
equivalent checkpoints can only be understood by reference to the
true purpose of border searches-maintaining national sovereignty
through limits on the immigration of aliens and the influx of
contraband.
Searches may be undertaken at checkpoints that constitute
virtual or distant border equivalents. Customs and immigration
searches conducted without a warrant at virtual border equivalents
fall squarely within the border search exception and thus are not

not envision judicial scrutiny of the "basic agency decision to canvass [a particular] area."
387 U.S. at 532. The judicialfunction here proposed would necessarily include passing on
exactly these basic decisions. Cf. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 282-83 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
101 The test proposed by this comment resembles the Fifth Circuit's current practice of
scrutinizing distant border equivalent designations, but differs in several significant respects. First, this test requires prior judicial scrutiny and the issuance of a warrant. This
procedure protects against invasion of private interests by ensuring review of the justification for the checkpoint before it is established. In contrast, ex post judicial review can prevent only the use of unlawfully obtained evidence, not the unlawful intrusion by which that
evidence was obtained. Second, this test compares the checkpoint site proposed by the INS
with other possible locations that might be used. The Fifth Circuit's analysis involves no
comparative factors and simply makes an isolated determination whether a particular site
meets the stated requirements. Third, this test, unlike the Fifth Circuit's analysis, is informed by explicit consideration of the important role national sovereignty interests play in
determining the propriety of a distant border equivalent designation. Most importantly, this
test limits the scope of the searches permitted at distant border equivalents. It distinguishes
immigration searches from the more intrusive and less justifiable customs searches of personal luggage or containers. The latter searches would no longer be permitted at distant
border checkpoints without full fourth amendment safeguards.
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subject to fourth amendment requirements. Because of their overinclusiveness, however, searches at distant border locations are
best considered through the analytic framework used to assess administrative searches. The resulting balance between the individual's privacy and autonomy interests and the sovereign interests of
the government suggests that customs searches at distant border
equivalents should not be allowed without full fourth amendment
safeguards. Immigration searches, in contrast, should be permitted
at distant border equivalents whenever they are undertaken pursuant to a valid area warrant, which may be granted under a reduced
standard of probable cause.
Paul S. Rosenzweig

